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The article focuses on the European Union’s (EU) humanitarian aid policy. It addresses
the challenge for the EU to deliver independent humanitarian aid while simultaneously
seeking to establish more coherence between its external policies.The article examines
how the EU tries to reconcile these potentially conflicting policy goals, both de jure and
in practice. Empirically, it explores the interaction between EU humanitarian aid and
development cooperation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and trade policy.
While the independence of the humanitarian aid delivery is, for the most part, not being
undermined, it remains difficult to establish positive synergies with other external poli-
cies because of institutional hurdles and legal constraints,as well as political obstacles and
operational incompatibilities.
1. Introduction
This article addresses the challenge faced by theEuropean Union (EU) in wanting to deliver humani-
tarian aid independent from foreign policy goals, while
simultaneously seeking to establish more coherence in
its external action.The preamble to the 1996 Council
Regulation on humanitarian aid, which provides the
basic legal framework for the further elaboration of a
specific humanitarian aid policy on behalf of the Euro-
pean Community (now the EU), makes explicit refer-
ence to the humanitarian imperative, highlighting that
the essential aim of humanitarian aid is to prevent or
relieve human suffering irrespective of any political con-
siderations (Council of the EU, 1996). However, the
EU’s humanitarian aid continued to intermesh regularly
with foreign policy goals until the end of the 1990s
(Versluys, 2008a).
A general willingness to strive for a more independ-
ent EU humanitarian aid policy – meaning autonomous
from economic, political, and military considerations –
in compliance with international humanitarian law
became clear during the drafting of the Constitutional
Treaty by the European Convention in 2002–2003. It
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underlined the separate nature of humanitarian aid in
comparison with other external policies, such as devel-
opment cooperation or Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP).The European Consensus on Humanitar-
ian Aid, adopted in December 2007 and signed on
behalf of the Council, the European Commission, the
European Parliament and the Member States, stresses
the independent nature of the EU’s policy in this field,
and stipulates that EU humanitarian aid is guided by the
four internationally agreed principles of neutrality, im-
partiality, humanity, and independence (European Union,
2008). These four principles are specific to humanita-
rian aid and make it distinct from other forms of aid.
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in
2009, humanitarian aid has become an EU external
policy in its own right. Significantly, the relevant treaty
provision (Article 214TFEU) was copied verbatim from
the abandoned Constitutional Treaty without any
further discussion.The 2007 European Consensus can
be regarded as the most recent document defining the
basic characteristics of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy.
The explicit recognition that the granting of ‘ad hoc
assistance and relief and protection for people in third
countries who are victims of natural and man-made
disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs
resulting from these different situations’ constitutes a
distinct policy of the EU’s external action (Article 214
TFEU) is an important step towards achieving the goal
of independent humanitarian aid.
At the same time, the EU has been increasingly striv-
ing for more coherent external action. Coherence of
the EU’s external activities – denoting the establish-
ment of positive synergies between different external
policies – has been a treaty-based requirement and
guiding principle.As will be covered in more depth later,
the Treaty of Lisbon attaches great importance to the
improved coherence of the EU’s external action
(Gebhard, 2011). The goal of enhanced coherence
draws on the intuitive assumption that by establishing
unity for a common purpose, the EU will become a
more efficient and effective foreign policy actor. Given
the close connection between the origins of a humani-
tarian crisis – a civil war, natural disaster, and extreme
poverty – and its consequences – large numbers of
displaced people and social and economic difficulties –
humanitarian aid is almost automatically linked to other
policy areas. Hence, one of the key challenges for the
EU is to ensure coherence in its response to crisis
situations between the different policies involved, while
safeguarding that coherence with these other external
policies does not come at the expense of the humani-
tarian aid policy’s independence.
This article examines how the EU tries to reconcile
these two policy goals de jure and in practice. First, we
contextualize the research question and indicate how it
links up with the debate on coherence of the EU’s
external action. Next, we explore how – if at all – the
EU tries to reconcile its policy goal of coherence with
the goal of independent humanitarian aid.We do so by
scrutinizing the European Consensus on Humanitarian
Aid and the Treaty of Lisbon.We then provide a more
in-depth analysis by focusing on the relationship of
humanitarian aid with three other policy domains,
namely development, CFSP, and trade. Based on an
analysis of policy documents and legal texts, we explore
whether and how the goals of increased coherence and
independent humanitarian aid are pursued together.
2. The quest for horizontal coherence
Given the close connection between the origins of a
humanitarian crisis and its consequences, humanitarian
aid can only be effective when it is linked to other
policies. In its response to international emergencies,
the EU needs to ensure coherence between humani-
tarian aid and the other external policies involved. But
ensuring coherence with the other external policies
may undermine the independence of EU’s humanitarian
aid policy.
The EU’s concern with coherence of its external
action has been addressed in an increasing number of
scholarly works (Gauttier, 2004; Gebhard, 2011;
Nuttall, 2005; Smith, 2004; Van Elsuwege, 2010). It is
generally assumed in the literature that enhanced
coherence positively affects the effectiveness of EU’s
external action. Possible negative effects of increased
coherence – such as a less independent humanitarian
aid – have been neglected.
‘Coherence’ is most commonly defined as denoting
both the absence of contradictions between different
areas of external policy and the establishment of syn-
ergies between them (Gauttier, 2004, pp. 23, 26;
Gebhard, 2011, p. 106; Van Elsuwege, 2010, pp. 1013–
14). In policy terms, coherence thus refers to the duty
of ensuring synergy between the different fields of EU’s
external action; it implies ‘a desirable, positive way of
interaction between the [policies] and their respective
bureaucracies, bound to the “service of a common
purpose” ’ (Gebhard, 2011, p. 112).
In practice, one can distinguish two dimensions of
coherence. On the one hand, there is the strategic, or
policy-related, dimension, which refers to the possibility
of conflicting objectives or clashing political agendas.On
the other hand, there is the technical, or procedural,
dimension, which points at the ‘administrative implica-
tions of having to reconcile two different channels of
policymaking, including their respective bureaucratic
machineries’ (Gebhard, 2011, p. 106).The achievement
of coherence can thus be thwarted by either proce-
dural, or operational, incompatibilities, or by conflicts
arising in the case of competing policy objectives,
diverging bureaucratic cultures, and the struggle for
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institutional power, the so-called ‘turf battling’ between
rivalrous institutions (Gebhard, 2011, pp. 111–112;
Nuttall, 2005, pp. 96–97). This article is primarily con-
cerned with what is termed ‘horizontal coherence’.The
concept regards the extent to which different EU
foreign affairs activities are ‘logically connected or
mutually enforcing’ (Smith, 2004, p. 173).
3. Reconciling coherence and
independence of humanitarian aid:
the legal challenge
The pursuit of coherence is particularly challenging and
potentially problematic for humanitarian aid policy
because of the stated objective of independence. It
remains contested whether the independence of
humanitarian aid has been reinforced through the inser-
tion of a separate chapter in the Lisbon Treaty (Van
Elsuwege & Orbie, 2014) or whether the EU’s quest for
more coherence would lead to the subordination of the
humanitarian imperative to overriding security, develop-
ment, and trade goals (as feared by some NGOs).
The principle of independence is explicitly mentioned
in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and
defined as: ‘the autonomy of humanitarian objectives
from political, economic, military or other objectives’
(European Union, 2008, p. 2). The sole purpose of
humanitarian aid is ‘to relieve and prevent the suffering
of victims of humanitarian crises’ (European Union,
2008, p. 2).The four humanitarian principles as defined
in the European Consensus correspond to the practice
of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs and are based on a number of
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
Resolutions.1
The Treaty of Lisbon only refers to ‘impartiality, neu-
trality and non-discrimination’ as the fundamental prin-
ciples guiding the EU’s humanitarian aid (Article 214(2)
TFEU). Despite the absence of an explicit reference to
independence in the Treaty of Lisbon, that principle still
binds the institutions and the member states in pursu-
ing the EU’s humanitarian aid policy, not least because
the treaty contains a reference to ‘the principles of
international law’ (Article 214(2) TFEU).The latter gen-
erally pertain to the principles of humanity, neutrality,
and impartiality, but the notion of independence may be
considered as a ‘derived principle’, insofar as its sub-
stance, i.e., the autonomy of humanitarian objectives
from political, military, or economic influences, follows
from the three other principles.
The extent to which the goal of independent humani-
tarian aid is de jure (not) reconciled with the goal of a
more coherent foreign policy depends largely – but not
exclusively – on how the respective provisions in the
Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus are inter-
preted. On the one hand, a potential conflict seems to
arise between the two goals in the first part of the
provision on humanitarian aid in the Lisbon Treaty: EU
humanitarian aid shall not only be implemented in com-
pliance with the general principles of international
(humanitarian) law, but it shall also be conducted ‘within
the framework of the principles and objectives of the
external action of the Union’ (Article 214(1)TFEU). It is
important to mention that this reference is included as
a standard clause in all treaty provisions dealing with EU
external policies and reflects a general preoccupation of
the Lisbon Treaty with ensuring the coherence of the
Union’s action on the international scene.Yet, a strict
reading of Article 214(1) TFEU might suggest that
humanitarian aid can be used as an instrument to
achieve the entire list of objectives mentioned in Article
21TEU, which is the key reference point listing the EU’s
general principles and objectives. These include the
ambition to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and
strengthen international security (Article 21(2)(c)TEU).
Obviously, such an interpretation potentially affects the
independence of humanitarian operations.However, the
inclusion of a horizontal list of external action objec-
tives in Article 21TEU does not absolve the institutions
from respecting the principle of conferral as expressed
in the specific legal bases mentioned in the treaties.2
Pursuant to Article 214(2) TFEU, the Union is
only competent to follow a humanitarian aid policy
in respect of international (humanitarian) law and
the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and non-
discrimination (cf. supra).3 The latter principles preclude
that humanitarian operations are used to pursue the
political, military, or economic objectives of the EU’s
external action listed in Article 21 TEU. The first sen-
tence of Article 214(1) TFEU cannot affect this legal
obligation. In sum, the incorporation of a specific treaty
provision on humanitarian aid helps to consolidate the
specific features of EU action in this field without,
however, solving the often blurred boundaries with
other policy areas in practice.
On the other hand, rather than regarding the refer-
ence to the principles and objectives of EU external
action in Article 214(1) TFEU as a potential threat to
the independence of humanitarian operations, it may be
considered as a general call for coherence in the EU’s
response to global emergencies.Although humanitarian
aid is subject to specific conditions and principles,which
implies that it is distinct from other forms of aid,
humanitarian assistance can only be effective when it is
linked to other policies. Such an interpretation is fully in
line with the European Consensus (European Union,
2008, p. 3), which explicitly states that EU humanitarian
aid ‘should take long-term development objectives
into account’ and ‘is closely linked to development
cooperation’.
With the Treaty of Lisbon, several innovations have
been introduced to increase the coherence of EU’s
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external action.A first innovation regards the inclusion
of a general list of EU external action objectives in
Article 21(1) TEU. Following the horizontal application
of Article 21 TEU, the objective ‘to assist populations,
countries and regions confronting natural or man-made
disasters’ – laid down in Article 21(1)(g) – does not
exclusively relate to the EU’s humanitarian aid policy,
but can, in principle, also be pursued on the basis of
other EU policies. Second, new institutional functions
and structures have been created, most notably the
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. In contrast to development coopera-
tion, humanitarian aid does not fall under the compe-
tence of the EEAS. Nevertheless, there is a general fear
among both the humanitarian aid community (Caritas,
2011; Oxfam, 2012) and DG ECHO (Georgieva, 2011a)
that the integration of humanitarian aid policy in the
EU’s external action under the Lisbon Treaty, as well as
an expanded interpretation of the coordinating role of
the EEAS, may lead to a politicization of humanitarian
aid delivery.
This concern has been further fuelled by the EU’s
aspiration of greater visibility, which has gone hand in
hand with the goal of enhanced coherence, based on
the intuitive belief that more visibility and coherence
are part and parcel of a more effective external
action.The lack of visibility and awareness of the EU’s
external activities has long haunted Brussels-based EU
policymakers.This also applies to the EU’s humanitarian
actions,which have often gone unnoticed by the general
public. However, in the case of humanitarian aid,
increased visibility may conflict with the humanitarian
imperative to provide aid on a needs-based approach
and may affect the independence from political, eco-
nomic, military, or other objectives. The latest step in
catering for increased visibility is the creation of a
European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, as codi-
fied in Article 214(5) TFEU (European Commission,
2012a, European Commission, 2012a, p. 2). Doubts have
been raised in the humanitarian aid community about
the implications of this initiative for the independence
of EU humanitarian aid (Schick, 2013).
In short, while the Lisbon Treaty seems to have
strengthened the independence of EU humanitarian
aid, the pursuit of coherence continues to be seen as
a challenge to achieving a needs-based humanitarian
aid. To examine this further, we now proceed with a
more in-depth analysis of how the EU tries to recon-
cile the policy goals of increased coherence and inde-
pendence in practice. Based on an analysis of policy
documents and legal texts, as well as concrete illus-
trations, we will focus on the relationship of humani-
tarian aid with three other policy domains, namely
development, CFSP – and in particular crisis manage-
ment – and trade.
4. Independence of humanitarian
aid and coherence with crisis
management, development, and
trade policies
4.1. The nexus between humanitarian aid and
crisis management operations
Based on the specific provision devoted to EU humani-
tarian aid in the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that aid
shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of
international law and with the principles of impartiality,
neutrality, and non-discrimination, it follows that EU
humanitarian aid cannot be used as a tool for facilitat-
ing and supporting CFSP crisis management opera-
tions. The European Consensus states that ‘EU
humanitarian aid is not a crisis management tool’
(European Union, 2008, p. 2). Article 40 TEU forms
an additional guarantee for the independence of EU
humanitarian aid in relation to potential foreign policy
and military influences. According to this provision,
the implementation of CFSP measures cannot affect
the application of the procedures and the extent
of the powers of the institutions under the EU’s non-
CFSP action and vice versa.
Nevertheless, Article 43 TEU provides that the
Union may use civilian and military means to pursue
humanitarian tasks. Under certain circumstances, meas-
ures adopted within the context of EU’s Common
Security and Defence Policy may be used to support
humanitarian operations. This is in line with the hori-
zontal application of Article 21(2)(g). However, the use
of Common Security and Defence Policy instruments
in the context of humanitarian operations remains
controversial. This is particularly the case for man-
made disasters because of their inherent political
dimension. The European Consensus upholds that ‘in
complex emergencies, recourse to civil protection
assets should rather be the exception’ (European
Union, 2008, p. 7). Similarly, it states that military assets
and capabilities in support of humanitarian relief
operations are to be ‘used only in very limited circum-
stances as a “last resort”, i.e., where there is no com-
parable civilian alternative and only the use of military
assets that are unique in capability and availability can
meet a critical humanitarian need’ (European Union,
2008, p. 7).
Respect for international humanitarian law requires
that EU military operations supporting humanitarian
assistance are subject to strict conditions.4 For
instance, such operations can only be employed upon
request by United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs and if all civilian alternatives
have been explored and exhausted. Crucially, any mili-
tary assets used under this scenario must remain under
civilian coordination and must respect the needs-based
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and neutral nature of humanitarian aid. In other words,
the humanitarian imperative has to be respected under
all circumstances.
A recent example illustrating the challenge to recon-
cile crisis management and humanitarian assistance is
the EU’s response to the conflict in Syria.5 On 24 June
2013, the European Commission and the High Repre-
sentative jointly announced ‘a comprehensive EU
approach to the Syrian crisis’ (European Commission
and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, 2013). The comprehensive EU
response has multiple objectives including the facilita-
tion of a political solution to the crisis, the prevention of
regional destabilization, and the offer of humanitarian
assistance. As such, humanitarian aid is part and parcel
of a broader EU strategy to tackle the crisis situation in
Syria.
Arguably, such an approach entails the risk that
EU-funded humanitarian aid is perceived as a foreign
policy tool (Pontiroli, Ponthieu, & Derderian, 2013).
This is particularly the case because the objective of
humanitarian assistance is linked with the sanctions
against the Assad regime. The plea for more humani-
tarian aid to Syria came from the EU Ministers of
Foreign Affairs at the same meeting where the sanc-
tions against the Syrian government were tightened
(Council of the EU, 2013a). In order to address the
humanitarian needs of the Syrian civilian population,
EU member states may authorize the sale, supply, or
transfer of key equipment and technology for strategic
sectors (oil, gas, and banking) in Syria. This is only
possible under certain conditions, including prior con-
sultation with the Syrian National Coalition for Oppo-
sition and Revolutionary Forces (Council of the EU,
2013b).
4.2. The nexus between humanitarian aid and
development policy
As humanitarian aid and development cooperation are
closely intertwined, it is often difficult to draw an exact
borderline between the ad hoc assistance under Article
214 TFEU and the structural assistance under Article
208 TFEU. In order to address this, the European
Commission has taken the lead in linking relief,
rehabilitation and development (LRRD) (European
Commission, 1996, 2001). However, the implementa-
tion of the LRRD concept has not always been easy;
the same goes for the establishment of synergies
between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO (Development
and Cooperation) in the ‘grey zone’ of rehabilitation
(Versluys 2008b, p. 105; Koddenbrock & Büttner, 2009,
pp. 127–129). This is due to diverging views between
the development and humanitarian actors within the
EU, as well as institutional and operational obstacles
(Koddenbrock & Büttner, 2009, pp. 127–129; Morazán,
Grünewald, Knoke, & Schäfer, 2012, p. 18). In 2003, an
inter-service group on transition, co-chaired by DG
ECHO and DG DEVCO, was established to follow a
more coherent approach. In practice, however, the
inter-service group has not borne a lot of fruit
(Morazán et al., 2012, p. 5).
Experience from field missions further reveals that
LRRD remains a challenge for the EU. A concrete
example is the EU’s response to the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti.While the EU proved to be a quick and generous
provider of emergency aid, it encountered several prob-
lems in delivering assistance for the transition towards
long-term development (Werleigh & Brouwer, 2011).
There was a considerable funding gap between short-
term relief and long-term development.The Haiti Task
Force set up after the earthquake to deal with ad hoc
crisis management has ‘created more competition and
power struggles between the Commission and the
EEAS and more delays than concrete results’ (Morazán
et al., 2012, p. 18).
The EU has recently taken some promising initiatives
in the area of LRRD, such as the piloting programmes in
the Horn of Africa, ‘Supporting Horn of Africa Resil-
ience’. Nevertheless, almost 20 years after the first
Commission communication on LRRD, it can only be
concluded that the concept has never been put into
practice beyond some pilot projects (Hauck, 2012).
Both Development Commissioner Piebalgs (2011) and
Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Georgieva (2011b)
admit that the EU’s approach to LRRD could be
improved in terms of concrete output on the ground,
for example by making the EU’s funding tools more
flexible. In sum, while LRRD does not affect the inde-
pendence of humanitarian aid delivery, as an instrument
to achieve coherence between humanitarian aid and
development cooperation, it has so far been missing its
target.
A recent EU initiative regarding the development-
humanitarian aid nexus is the Commission communi-
cation on resilience (cf. Benadusi, 2014). Resilience is
defined as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a
community, a country or a region to withstand, to
adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and
shocks’ (European Commission, 2012b, p. 5). As
such, it requires a comprehensive approach that
includes risk assessment tools, a focus on prevention
and preparedness, and an enhanced response to
crises. A policy based on enhancing resilience implies
that donors are not only just intervening to address
the consequences of emergency crises, but also that
they tackle the root causes of recurrent crises
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 2).As this requires a
coherent approach between humanitarian aid and
development assistance, the concept of resilience has
been central to debates about improving EU’s LRRD
policy.
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4.3. The nexus between humanitarian aid and
trade policy
A concrete case to explore the nexus between humani-
tarian aid and trade is the EU’s response to the devas-
tating floods in Pakistan in 2010.The European Council
called not only for the provision of humanitarian aid but
also for the adoption of additional measures deemed
essential for Pakistan’s recovery and growth. It was
agreed ‘to grant exclusively to Pakistan increased
market access to the EU through the immediate and
time limited reduction on key imports from Pakistan’
(European Council, 2010, p. 10). The decision of the
European Council to use a trade policy instrument for
the achievement of a humanitarian objective was fully in
line with the rationale of Article 21TEU and the Lisbon
Treaty to increase the coherence of the EU’s external
action. Nevertheless, the initiative faced significant legal
and political obstacles.
Several members of the European Parliament as well
as import-sensitive industries from France, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain challenged the appropriateness of such a
measure. In particular, they raised concerns about
the economic implications for the EU’s textiles and
ethanol industry and the absence of any political
conditionality in the Commission’s proposal (European
Parliament, 2011).Given the humanitarian inspiration of
the trade initiative, the latter point is striking, as it
would undermine the humanitarian principle of inde-
pendence, according to which aid to people in need
cannot be subject to any political, economic, or military
conditions.
The measure was adopted in the context of EU’s
Common Commercial Policy under the legal basis of
Article 207(2) TFEU and not as part of the EU’s
humanitarian assistance under Article 214 TFEU.There-
fore, the humanitarian principles laid down in Article
214(2) TFEU and reflected in the European Consensus
do not automatically apply to this type of measures.
Within the context of the Common Commercial
Policy, the granting of trade preferences can be made
conditional upon respect for fundamental rights.6
Hence, it is not surprising that the European Parlia-
ment only accepted the proposed regulation after the
inclusion of explicit conditionality provisions. Accord-
ing to the regulation, Pakistan is only entitled to
benefit from the preferential arrangements if it does
not engage in ‘serious and systematic violations of
human rights, including core labour rights, fundamental
principles of democracy and the rule of law’ (European
Union, 2012, p. 43). Members of European Parliament
also inserted a statement that the measure is not a
precedent for the EU’s trade policy, but strictly a
response to the specific situation in Pakistan, thereby
limiting the consistent application of trade preferences
in the context of humanitarian catastrophes.
The EU’s initiative to support Pakistan also faced
some hurdles at the level of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). Given that the unilateral introduction of
trade preferences would be in breach of the Most
Favoured Nation and non-discrimination principles,
the EU had to request a waiver (Bartels, 2007). Some
WTO members, such as India, suspected that the EU
granted favourable market access to Pakistan based on
geopolitical or other EU interests rather than humani-
tarian motives. Looking at historical antecedents, India’s
suspicion was probably not unfounded (Portela &
Orbie, 2014).
The Pakistan case demonstrates that the EU’s trade
policy may be used as an instrument to promote
humanitarian objectives in the wake of a global emer-
gency. However, the broader political context with the
geostrategic importance of Pakistan may have influ-
enced the decision. Moreover, the final EU Regulation
does not safeguard the independence of the humani-
tarian initiative given the conditionality and safeguard
clauses. In addition, the case clearly shows the limits
and challenges faced by the EU in pursuing the goal of
increased coherence between its external policies. To
begin with, the final EU Regulation was adopted in
October 2012, i.e., more than 2 years after the cata-
strophic events, and is a diluted version of the original
Commission proposal (European Commission, 2010).
Apart from the addition of conditionality and safeguard
clauses, the more limited scope as well as the shorter
duration of the trade preferences – they apply for only
1 year – raise questions about the effective added
value of such a measure (Khorana, Yeung, Kerr, &
Perdikis, 2012). The conclusion may thus be that
forging coherence between EU trade policy and
humanitarian aid objectives is very difficult to establish,
inter alia, because it is closely connected to economic
interests.
5. Conclusion
Horizontal coherence is always difficult to achieve for
any international actor. However, it is even more diffi-
cult for a highly compartmentalized actor, such as the
EU, to forge synergetic relations between the different
foreign policy fields. Realizing policy coherence is argu-
ably even more challenging in the case of humanitarian
aid policy. Since the early 2000s, the EU has increasingly
emphasized the independence of this policy domain.
Yet, over the same time period, the EU has developed
military capabilities and it has profiled itself as a leading
actor in development aid. The EU has also pursued a
pro-active international trade policy and has explicitly
expressed its ambition to be a coherent actor on the
world scene.These developments led to the puzzle that
inspired this article: how – if at all – does the EU
reconcile the potentially conflicting policy goals of an
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independent humanitarian aid policy and a coherent
external action?
With the European Consensus and the LisbonTreaty,
the EU has put in place a solid political and legal frame-
work for the implementation of a strong humanitarian
aid policy.This article has shown that, although decision-
making in the field of humanitarian aid is still essentially
steered within the Commission DG ECHO, and
although relations with the EEAS do not appear to have
undermined the fundamental role of humanitarian prin-
ciples (OECD-DAC, 2012, pp. 90–5), the quest for
coherence does indeed pose challenges to the EU’s
humanitarian aid policy.
To begin with, the trend towards a more compre-
hensive approach to crisis management, including a
more active coordinating role for the EEAS, may lead
to further institutional tensions with DG ECHO. A
clear-cut division of responsibilities as well as a suffi-
cient awareness of the humanitarian aid specificities
among all actors are crucial to ensure effective coop-
eration on the ground. Second, there has still been
little practical progress on linking emergency aid, reha-
bilitation, and development. A recent assessment con-
ducted by the OECD revealed that ‘opportunities
for greater programme coherency between ECHO,
EuropeAid and EEAS are sometimes being missed’
(OECD-DAC, 2012, p. 95). Third, the ambition of the
Lisbon Treaty to facilitate the combination of different
policy instruments in response to global emergencies
faces political and legal obstacles.This has been clearly
illustrated with the Pakistan case, where the tempo-
rary introduction of autonomous trade preferences
faced strong opposition both within the EU and at the
level of the WTO.
Finally, it appears that the EU is a key player when it
comes to providing and coordinating humanitarian
assistance, but difficulties remain regarding the integra-
tion of humanitarian aid programmes in more compre-
hensive strategies of disaster response. While the
independence of the humanitarian aid delivery has not
been undermined so far, the EU experiences difficulties
to establish positive synergies between the respective
external policies because of institutional hurdles and
legal restraints, as well as political obstacles and opera-
tional incompatibilities.
Notes
1. Notably United Nations General Assembly (1991, 2003)
and United Nations Security Council (2006).
2. This can be derived from Article 3(6) TEU, which states
that ‘the Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate
means commensurate with the competences which are
conferred upon it in the treaties’. See also Dashwood
(2011, p. 35).
3. Moreover, in accordance to the settled case law of
the European Court of Justice, the EU must respect
international law in the exercise of its powers (see
European Court of Justice, 1992).
4. Those conditions are laid down in the ‘Guidelines on the
use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief ’
(Oslo guidelines) and the ‘Guidelines on the use of mili-
tary and civil defense assets to support United Nations
humanitarian activities in complex emergencies’ (MCDA
guidelines). See European Union, 2008, p.6.
5. Another example illustrating how the interplay between
crisis management and humanitarian assistance has
translated into practice is the EU’s reaction the crisis
in Libya in April 2011 (see Van Elsuwege and Orbie,
2014).
6. However, granting trade preferences for reasons related
to foreign policy may not always be compatible with
international trade law, as became clear in the EC-Tariff
Preferences case (WTO, 2004).
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